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WILLIAM F. COYNE, JR.*
I. OVERVIEW
A. Too Soon Old, Too Late Smart
Over my first ten years as a lawyer handling civil litigation I noticed that
in many of my cases the first serious settlement discussions took place shortly
before trial. This was not good. When I am getting ready for trial, the last
thing I want to do is to talk settlement. I have always felt a visceral
incompatibility between final trial preparation and meaningful settlement
discussions. It seemed that there ought to be a way to find out sooner if the
case really needed to be tried. However, I found a perplexing resistance to
early settlement discussions-in opposing counsel, in my clients, and in
myself.
Then I got involved in litigation in the United Kingdom and a light went
on. There, traditionally, solicitors handle settlement discussions and
"quarterback" the case, calling in the barrister as needed for pleadings,
arguments, and trial. This gives both barristers and solicitors a single-minded
efficiency in carrying out their respective duties. I saw that lawyers in the
United States could achieve that same one-mindedness if a lawyer other than
the trial lawyer-i.e., separate settlement counsel-were given the task of
handling settlement discussions, either before litigation starts, or as it
proceeds. Over the last nine or so years of my practice, I have tried, in
various ways and with varying degrees of success, to separate responsibility
for settlement from responsibility for trial.
This Article urges that use of settlement counsel is both wise and
workable.1 I use the term "settlement counsel," rather than the equivalent, and
* William F. Coyne, Jr. is an attorney and a mediator. He is a partner in the Boston
firm of Lawson & Weitzen, LLP. His e-mail address is wfcoynejr@aol.com. He would like
to take this opportunity to thank those who agreed to be interviewed for this Article-James
McGuire, Judge John Wagner, Judge Daniel Winslow, Natasha Lisman, and David
Hoffman. He would particularly like to thank David Hoffman and Jim McGuire for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft of the Article.
I While doing research for this Article, I found that the idea of using separate
settlement counsel has been advanced before. See generally Roger Fisher, He Who Pays
the Piper, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 150, 155-157; Roger Fisher, What
About Negotiation as a Specialty?, 69 A.B.A. J. 1221, 1223 (1983) [hereinafter Fisher,
What About Negotiation]; see also Gary Mendelsohn, Note, Lawyers as Negotiators, 1
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more prevalent, "ADR counsel" because I want to emphasize the goal-early
settlement, rather than the method-Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
The underlying premises are the following: (1) the optimal result in a legal
dispute can often be achieved by resolving the dispute before litigation
commences, or at least before it proceeds through full discovery; (2) the initial
attempt to settle has a greater chance of success if made by separate settlement
counsel; (3) the greatest benefits are likely if settlement counsel is not a
member of the same firm as trial counsel; and (4) in appropriate cases, the
benefits of employing settlement counsel will outweigh the costs even if
settlement is not reached at the outset of litigation and trial counsel must be
called in.
I have several goals in writing this Article, other than encouraging the use
of settlement counsel as a method of dispute resolution. First, I want to
synthesize some of the best insights from the extensive literature on legal
dispute resolution. Second, I want to give substance to terms which appear in
the literature, sometimes without much explanation-terms such as "the
prevailing legal culture" and "the lawyer's standard philosophical map." The
lawyers who inhabit scholarly publications are frequently two-dimensional
creatures, with characteristics conducive to the author's argument. They have
little to do with the flesh and blood lawyers I have encountered over the past
twenty years. A fuller appreciation of the complexities lawyers face should
help generate better models and better solutions to the problems of designing
dispute resolution systems.
Finally, the view that lawyers are part of the problem with the legal
system, if not the entire problem, has become prevalent. The consequent
vilification of lawyers has distracted us as a society, by design or not, from
some of the fundamental problems with the way we deliver legal services. 2 It
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 139, 148-167 (1996) (arguing that a pure negotiator has
advantages over a litigator in overcoming certain barriers to settlement).
2 On April 28, 1998, a story on the front page of the business section in the Boston
Globe trumpeted the vitality of the nation's economy. It noted stock market jitters caused
by Federal Reserve worries that "there is too much good news coming out of the US
economy." Charles Stein, Dow Dives of Fear of Rate Hike, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28,
1998, at DI. An accompanying Associated Press story noted that "Americans' incomes
surged at more than double the inflation rate last year." Growing Incomes, Falling Prices
Mean More Purchasing Power, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 1998, at D16.
In the Metro section the same day, it was reported that, despite overflowing state
coffers, three out of five low income people who seek help in civil matters from
Massachusetts's legal services groups are turned away. The reason: lack of resources. See
Scott Lehigh, 3 of 5 Are Denied Aid in Civil Law Despite Surplus, State Falls Short,
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 28, 1998, at B 1. It is intriguing that at a time when legal services are
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has also made it more difficult for lawyers to participate in the dialogue that
must occur if progress is to be made. I hope by presenting a more balanced
view of lawyers in dispute resolution to stimulate that dialogue.
B. Summary of the Argument
Clients, courts, and the public yearn for a less adversarial approach to
dispute resolution. Lawyers are frequently blamed for the current state of
affairs. However, lawyers are, for the most part, reacting rationally and in
good faith to existing incentives and expectations. The current approach
imposes a duty on lawyers to resolve cases quickly, while ignoring the real
constraints on settlement and incentives to delay resolution.
The constraints are of several sorts. One is our view of how lawyers
resolve disputes. Some people see lawyers romantically-as knights in shining
armor, or as hired guns. Others see them realistically, using the litigation_
process to try to pound opponents into a favorable settlement. But each of
these models has elements that make it difficult to settle cases quickly.
Conversely, the model of the lawyer as a problem-solver, which could
encourage efficient resolution, is neither as clearly defined nor as widely
known.
Aside from the fact that problem-solvers are breaking new ground, there
are significant incentives for lawyers not to embrace early settlement. These
incentives include the need to market services, the desire not to appear weak,
the obligation to represent a client zealously, the thirst for justice, and last, but
perhaps not least, the desire to maximize income. In addition, it is extremely
difficult, psychologically, for an attorney to act as an effective advocate and,
at the same time, to encourage settlement. In the face of these obstacles, a
poorly defined and toothless "duty to settle" is not likely to bring about the
behavior which critics seek.
When a lawyer is hired for the sole purpose of determining if a fair
resolution is possible without litigation-i.e., to act as settlement counsel-the
lawyer's interests are aligned with the goal of achieving early settlement.
Settlement counsel should be in a better position to use interest-based
bargaining techniques and should be better able to avoid some of the common
obstacles to early settlement. Because settlement counsel is encouraged to use
"value-creating" techniques before "value-claiming" begins, the prospect of
early settlement should improve.
beyond the reach of even many middle-income persons, the primary focus of concern with
the legal system is excessive litigation.
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There are potential disadvantages to the use of settlement counsel, most
notably the risk of increased cost if the case is not settled. However, there are
ways to minimize the increased costs. In addition, there may be benefits from
using settlement counsel which outweigh any additional costs. For example,
overall litigation costs may be reduced as a result of focusing on the important
issues, reducing the need for formal discovery, diminishing the demonization
of the other side, and establishing realistic reference points which will
facilitate later settlement efforts. The real promise of settlement counsel,
however, is in promoting early settlement.
II. THE ELUSIVE GOAL OF EARLY SETTLEMENT
There is tremendous pressure on the legal profession to avoid litigation.
Sometimes the focus is on "frivolous" suits-suing over hot coffee. The
concern here is with a different problem-delay in settlement. While about
ninety percent of civil cases settle before trial, 3 there is widespread
dissatisfaction with the amount of time and money spent before the cases are
resolved. 4 The public image of lawyers has taken a beating. Since the 1976
Pound Conference, lawyers have been singled out as the primary cause of the
litigation explosion. 5 While judges and academics have pointed criticisms to
make, the true measure of public venom is better gauged by watching Leno
or Letterman.
At the same time, some progress has been made in use of alternative
dispute resolution. Every year, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution
3 See Mary J. Davis, Summary Adjudication Methods in United States Civil
Procedure, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 229 & n.2 (1998) (noting that 85% to 95% of all civil
cases settle before proceeding to trial). This figure has been consistent over the past 15
years. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 1 (1983) (noting
that 90% of civil cases settle before trial).
4 See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE'S COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE COURTS,
MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, REINVENTING JUSTICE 2022, at 18 (1992)
(stating that more than 4 in 10 survey respondents identified "caseload too full/too
crowded" and "process too slow" as major problems facing courts); KENNETH J.
THYGERSON, CONTROLLING CORPORATE LEGAL COSTS: NEGOTIATION AND ADR
TECHNIQUES FOR EXECUTIVES 49 (1994); Samuel Issacharoff et al., Bargaining
Impediments and Settlement Behavior, in DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BRIDGING THE
SETTLEMENT GAP 51, 51-52 (David A. Anderson ed., 1996).
5 See Issacharoff et al., supra note 4, at 51; Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture,
or Fledgling Adulthood, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REOL. 297, 310-313 (1996).
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reports slow, but steady, growth in the use of ADR. 6 The growth of
contractually mandated ADR contributes to the push for early resolution. In
particular, recent changes to the widely used form contracts published by the
American Institute of Architects portend more mediation of construction
disputes. 7 The primary public response to the litigation "nightmare" has been
to foster court-sponsored ADR programs, generally held at around the time
of the pretrial conference.8 While resolution at this point avoids the public
6 See Briefs: Surveys Show Increasing ADR Use, 15 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS
LiTrIG. 85, 85 (1997).
7 Section 4.5.1 of the 1997 edition of American Institute of Architects (AIA)
Document A201 provides that "[a]ny Claim arising out of or related to the
Contract... shall... be subject to mediation as a condition precedent to arbitration or
the institution of legal or equitable proceedings by either party." GENERAL CONDITIONS OF
THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION Doc. A201 § 4.5.1 (American Institute of Architects
1997). The A201 is the standard form of general conditions incorporated into construction
contracts. Similar language appears in § 1.3.4 of AIA Document B141, the standard form
agreement between owner and architect. See GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CONSTRUCTION Doc. B141 § 1.3.4 (American Institute of Architects 1997).
8 See David S. Winston, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes:
"You Can Lead a Horse to Water..... " 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 187, 187-189
(1996). One commentator has referred to Frank Sanders's "multi-door courthouse" concept
as the "unifying ADR initiative," and the "most useful" contribution to emerge from the
seminal 1976 Pound Conference. Stempel, supra note 5, at 324. The 1976 Pound
Conference in St. Paul, Minnesota is widely seen as the "birth" of the modem ADR
movement. See id. at 309. Then-Chief Justice Warren Burger was the driving force of the
Conference, see id. at 310, and a prominent proponent of the view that the litigation
explosion was the result of overly contentions lawyers who needed to be controlled. See id.
at 311-313 & n.45.
Court-sponsored ADR takes various forms, both as described in the Winston article,
see generally Winston, supra, and in my personal experience. In the Federal District Court
for the District of Massachusetts, Local Rule 16.1 requires each party and each attorney
to certify, before the initial scheduling conference, that attorney and client have conferred
to consider resolution of the litigation by ADR. Local Rule 16.4 requires judges and
magistrates to "encourage the resolution of disputes by settlement or alternative dispute
resolution programs," D. MASS. R. 16.4(A), and to "inquire as to the utility of the parties'
conducting settlement negotiations" at every conference, D. MASS. R. 16.4(B).
Participation in ADR is not mandatory, and there is no ADR screening conference, as such.
See D. MASS. R. 16.4.
In the Superior Court for Middlesex County, in Cambridge, Massachusetts, cases are
routinely scheduled for an individual ADR screening conference with the Middlesex Multi-
Door Courthouse. Cases in the Superior Court for Suffolk County are screened in a joint
session together with other cases; the Massachusetts Office of Dispute Resolution panel of
mediators then gives lawyers a presentation and the opportunity to volunteer for mediation.
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expense of a trial, it means that the parties will not obtain one of the primary
benefits of settlement-avoiding the substantial fees and expenses incurred in
discovery and pretrial motions.
Efforts to reduce litigation by court-sponsored ADR have met with only
modest success not only because the ADR is introduced so late in the process,
but because the planners have given insufficient attention to the lawyer's
critical role as "gatekeeper" of the choice to mediate or not.9 The result is
that, while mediation training has become a growth industry, there is
frequently no need for the services of new court mediators. Mediation panels
are full and not particularly busy. 10
The blame for the tepid success of ADR is frequently laid at the feet of the
lawyers. Corporations with ADR policies report that outside counsel rarely
advise mediation, and participate reluctantly, often as a result of a court
mandate. 1 ' The 1996 American Bar Association Journal survey reported that,
while half of lawyers surveyed said they prefer mediation to litigation and
arbitration, more than half the respondents said they had not actually
participated in any ADR event during the past five years.12 Typical reasons
See SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT/TRIAL COURT STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE FOR ADMIN. & MANAGEMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT, REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE ON THE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 23-25 (1998). Cases are not scheduled for screening in the
Superior Court for Middlesex County until at least 6.5 months after filing. See id. at 37.
In this Author's experience, ADR screening does not occur until discovery is complete or
nearly complete and the case is ready for a final pretrial conference.
9 See Gary Goodpaster, Lawsuits as Negotiations, 8 NEGOTIATION J. 221, 223 (1992);
see also Stempel, supra note 5, at 355.
10 See David A. Hoffman, President's Column, SPIDR NEW ENG. UPDATE, Nov. 27,
1998, at 2, 2 (noting the proliferation of training programs for new mediators). Hoffman,
the current president of the New England Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
(SPIDR), continues: "Many of these new mediators have found it difficult to find even
volunteer opportunities, leading one very senior mediator in Massachusetts to comment that
the proliferation of mediation training programs constitutes a 'serious ethical problem.'"
Id. at 2; see also David Plympton, Comment: Ethical Duties of Mediation Trainers in the
Promotion of Training Programs, SPIDR NEW ENG. UPDATE, Jan. 6, 1999, at 1, 1 ("In
the past 10 years, many newly trained mediators have called me asking about ADR
employment opportunities. Incredibly, most have been referred to me by their trainers, who
know very well that there are few such opportunities.").
11 See Briefs: Surveys Show Increasing ADR Use, supra note 6, at 85; see also Special
Supplemental Proceedings, CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution Spring Meeting, 14
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS LITIG. 98, 98 (1996).
12 See Richard C. Reuben, The Lawyer Turns Peacemaker, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at
54, 54-55.
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offered for the lack of enthusiasm are greed, lack of skill in negotiation, and
a reluctance to try new ways of resolving disputes. 13 This dovetails neatly with
the view that "lawyers foment controversy and prolong litigation because they
make money by doing so." 14
The truth is more complicated. Survey data show that many lawyers (1)
want to settle cases sooner; (2) want to use interest-based, rather than
positional bargaining; 15 and (3) participate willingly and effectively in
13 See THYGERSON, supra note 4, at 113; see also Special Supplemental Proceedings,
supra note 11, at 98.
14 Issacharoff et al., supra note 4, at 51.
15 The terminology used to describe approaches to negotiation is varied and confusing.
One basic distinction involves the style of the negotiator. So a "competitive," adversarial,
or hard bargaining style is distinguished from a "cooperative" style. WILLIAMS, supra note
3, at 18-19.
In Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, "positional" bargaining
is distinguished from "principled" bargaining. ROGER FISHER Er AL., GETTING TO YES:
NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WrrHour GIVING IN 10-12 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991). The
authors' focus is on the substance of the discussions rather than the personal style of the
negotiator. The authors urge readers to eschew the traditional method of bargaining in
which adversaries stake out a position-e.g., a desired settlement amount-and then argue
that their position is more reasonable, more realistic, or fairer than the opponent's position.
Do not argue over positions, they say. Instead, focus on interests and collaborate in finding
solutions which satisfy the most important interests of all parties, choosing among
alternatives based upon shared principles and objective criteria. See id.
Principled negotiation is also called "integrative," "interest-based," "win-win," or
"problem-solving" bargaining. Gary Goodpaster, Rational Decision-Making in Problem-
Solving Negotiation: Compromise, Interest-Valuation, and Cognitive Error, 8 OHIO ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 299, 299 (1993). Some commentators consider the Getting to Yes
approach to be a form of cooperative negotiation, see Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie,
Opening Offers and Out-of-Court Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way,
10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 1, 16 n.41, 21 (1994), though Fisher, Ury, and Patton take
pains to distinguish principled negotiation from both competitive and cooperative
negotiation. See FISHER Er AL., supra, at 9-14.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow distinguishes between adversarial and problem-solving
negotiation, basing her distinction on the goals of the parties. The term adversarial, as she
uses it, refers not to the competitive or adversarial style of negotiation, but, more
generally, to the traditional "zero-sum" attitude toward negotiation-i.e., maximizing my
gain at your expense. Her problem-solving is very close to Fisher, Ury, and Patton's
principled negotiation. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 764-765, 817-824
(1984).
In this Article, I use the term "cooperative negotiation" to refer to bargaining
characterized by willingness to make trade offs and use concessions to induce concessions
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mediation programs, even when pressured into mediation by the courts. 16 A
survey of about five hundred litigators in New Jersey showed that seventy-
nine percent felt that cases should settle sooner. 17 The same survey reported
that, though positional bargaining was used entirely, or almost entirely, in
seventy-one percent of the cases involved, the lawyers preferred to use more
problem-solving techniques.18 "Sixty-one percent [of the lawyers surveyed]
thought that problem-solving negotiation should be used more than it now
is., 19
In addition several studies indicate that lawyers do not obstruct efforts to
mediate cases, and that they speak favorably of mediation. In a study revealing
the experiences of divorce lawyers with mediation, the lawyers proved,
contrary to expectations, to be willing and helpful participants. 20 A 1990
survey of construction lawyers showed that almost half thought that mediation
should be used in most or all construction disputes.2 ' The 1994 Construction
Industry Survey on Dispute Avoidance and Resolution shows attorneys prefer
mediation over arbitration as a method of dispute resolution. 22 A 1996 survey
published in the American Bar Association Journal reported that fifty-one
percent of lawyers surveyed prefer mediation to litigation as a means of
resolving disputes, while only thirty-one percent prefer litigation to
mediation. 23
A recent study of mediation in three superior court programs in
Massachusetts also suggests that lawyers participate willingly, and effectively,
in mediation. In fifty percent to eighty percent of mediated cases reported,
there was resolution of at least some issues in the case. Middlesex County
by the opponent. I use the term "adversarial" to refer to the style of the negotiator.
16 See Milton Heumann & Jonathan M. Hyman, Negotiation Methods and Litigation
Settlement Methods in New Jersey: "You Can't Always Get What You Want," 12 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 253, 254 (1997).
17 See id.
18 See id. at 255.
19 Id.
20 See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant
Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317, 1364-
1365 (1995).
21 See Douglas A. Henderson, Mediation Success: An Empirical Analysis, 11 OHIO ST.
J. ON Disp. RESOL. 105, 129 (1996).
22 See Darrick M. Mix, Note, ADR in the Construction Industry: Continuing the
Development of a More Efficient Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 463, 478-479 (1997).
23 See Reuben, supra note 12, at 54, 56.
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reported full settlement in over seventy percent of the cases involved in the
study. 24 Lawyers said that they participated in mediation not because of
pressure from the client but because of their own desire to save their clients'
time and money and their feeling that mediation might produce a better result
than litigation.2 5 More than ninety percent of the attorneys surveyed would be
willing to try mediation again. 26
III. LAWYERS AND SETTLEMENT: How MANY BLIND MEN
DOES IT TAKE TO DESCRIBE AN ELEPHANT?
One might gather from the literature that there is a discrepancy between
what lawyers say they would like to do and what they are actually doing.
Cynics might explain this as hypocrisy-lawyers say what they think the
public wants to hear, while carrying on business as usual. Those of a more
charitable bent might see only human fallibility-we have left undone those
things which we ought to have done, and we have done those things which we
ought not to have done. But both of these approaches suffer from the same
shortcoming as many of the surveys-they assume that all lawyers share
common perspectives and common values. Sometimes this assumption has a
significant impact on the usefulness of the survey. For instance, the failure to
control for the differing interests of plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers working
on a contingent fee, insurance defense lawyers paid by salary, and other
attorneys working on an hourly rate, diminishes the impact of Heumann and
Hyman's very interesting survey of New Jersey lawyers. 27
24 See RICHARD J. MAIMAN, STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF THE
MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT/TRIAL COURT, AN EVALUATION OF SELECTED
MEDIATION PROGRAMS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 34 (1997).
25 See id. at 31.
26 See id. at 36. One must use caution in drawing conclusions from the Massachusetts
study. In Massachusetts, participation in mediation is voluntary; one would expect that
attorneys who choose mediation might be predisposed in its favor. A substantial number
of cases were not sent to mediation at the screening. In Middlesex County, 27% of the
cases were sent to mediation and 51% were continued for trial; in Suffolk County the
respective percentages were 37% and 39%. See id. at 25. Lawyers may, or may not, have
been instrumental in keeping cases out of mediation.
27 This is the study referred to earlier, see discussion supra notes 16-19 and
accompanying text, which reports a disparity between attorneys' desire to use problem-
solving and their actual use of positional methods. The authors of the study acknowledge
that varying financing arrangements may have an effect on approaches to negotiation. See
Heumann & Hyman, supra note 16, at 292. However, the survey results are reported in
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The short answer is that all lawyers cannot be painted with the same
brush. Some lawyers do aggressively seek to settle cases. Others do not. But
often, when lawyers fail to settle cases early in the process, it is not because
they are ignorant or greedy, but because they are smart. The fact is that
lawyers are working in a system that provides little incentive to settle cases
and many incentives not to do so. Those incentives include not only specific
financial and psychological factors, but also the way in which we, as a
society, picture the lawyer's role.
A. Five Models of Lawyers in Dispute Resolution
1. Champion
The lawyers we grew up admiring-Clarence Darrow, Atticus Finch,
Perry Mason-were all cast from the same mold. The lawyer is a knight in
shining armor, who fights the client's fight and bears the client's burden. The
Champion believes that disputes are about facts and about securing legal
rights. When the parties cannot agree on the facts, they need a neutral forum
to adjudicate the facts and declare their rights. The Champion's focus is on
resolving the conflict within the familiar confines of the courtroom, by the
rules. Champions do not settle cases; they try them.
Using this romanticized model, it can be hard to understand why nine out
of ten cases settle before trial. From the Champion's perspective, settlement
is an aberration, a failure of the process. It occurs either because the parties
come to realize that their view of the facts was in error or because the expense
of litigation forces an abortive settlement before justice can be achieved. Early
settlement is unlikely, both because settlement is an afterthought and because
the facts have not been sufficiently developed to permit an intelligent
settlement.
terms of percentages for all attorneys, without differentiating between plaintiffs' attorneys
and defense attorneys, and without regard for how the attorneys were compensated. See id.
at 255-256. It would be very interesting to know if plaintiffs' attorneys or defense attorneys
predominate among the 47% of attorneys who think that positional bargaining should be
used less. See id. at 256. It would also be interesting to know whether defense attorneys
from outside firms who are compensated at their normal hourly rate have views that differ
from those of attorneys who are salaried employees of the insurance companies, who are
employees of "captive" law firms, or who work for firms that take insurance work at
reduced hourly rates.
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2. Hired Gun
The Hired Gun is the Champion's evil twin. The goal is to win at all costs
and to be compensated accordingly. The Hired Gun does not have the
Champion's narrow focus. If a smaller, weaker opponent can be stonewalled
until he exhausts his resources and surrenders, so much the better. If critical
documents must be overlooked, or even destroyed, as the price of victory, it
is a small price to pay. It is this image of the lawyer which, more than
anything else, led to the strong-handed approach taken since the 1976 Pound
Conference. 28 This image, like that of the Champion, can seem a caricature,
but in No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in
America, Ralph Nader and Wesley Smith provide some vivid examples of the
Hired Gun at work.2 9
The Hired Gun, like the Champion, is interested in facts. But for the
Hired Gun, the most important facts are frequently those which he (or his
client) knows, but the other side does not.30 The Hired Gun's refusal to
discuss settlement is strategic. There will be no serious discussion of
settlement until the other side demonstrates both a strong likelihood of success
at trial and sufficient resources to overcome determined stonewalling. When
bargaining occurs, it is a zero-sum game. 31 The game is won or lost
depending on the attorney's ability to convince the other side what the court
will do, given the facts elicited in discovery. Early settlement is unlikely
because only after discovery will one know whether the other side will be able
to prove its case. More importantly, to seek early settlement is to give up the
opportunity to achieve complete victory with steamroller tactics.
28 See supra note 8 (discussing the Pound Conference).
29 See RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, No CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND
THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 3-59 (1996).
30 1 have tried, wherever possible, to avoid gender-specific pronouns. Where I could
not find an acceptable work-around, I have resorted to alternating use of the masculine and
the feminine pronouns. I intend both to be understood as inclusive of the other.
31 A zero-sum game is defined as one in which the gains of one party equal the losses
of the other. To use a familiar analogy, in a zero-sum game the parties have a pie with a
fixed size; the only question is who will get the bigger piece. When parties view their
situation as zero-sum, they are likely to litigate, not settle. See Goodpaster, supra note 9,
at 222-223.
377
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3. Litigator
In his 1992 article, Lawsuits as Negotiations,32 Gary Goodpaster draws
a gritty picture of the way in which lawyers actually work. In his view, it is
not surprising that so many cases settle. That is what the parties, and their
lawyers, really intended from the outset. 33 Litigation is an effective tool in the
negotiator's toolbox. These lawyers do not seek trial; they are Litigators, not
trial lawyers. The gQal is to pummel the other side into a favorable settlement
posture. Litigation is valuable precisely because of the delay, expense, and
pain it involves.
With the ongoing cost of litigation, the zero-sum game is transformed into
a negative-sum game. 34 This leads to a "hurting stalemate" in which a
negotiated resolution is likely. 35 In essence, the Litigators see that their
original strategy of using the litigation to force a favorable settlement has
failed, and the goal now becomes to end the dispute on the best possible
terms. Unfortunately, the "best possible terms" just before trial may leave the
client in a worse net position than a settlement which could have been attained
before litigation started.
With the Litigator, settlement barriers are not so much strategic as
tactical. The Litigator really wants to settle, but use of litigation as a
negotiation tool amplifies all of the communication and psychological barriers
to settlement.36 Early settlement is not likely given the plan to use the delay
and cost of litigation to extract concessions.
Goodpaster's model of litigation as negotiation does not apply to all
lawsuits but is a jarringly accurate description of at least part of what occurs
in many cases. It is not a pretty picture. In his view, litigation is neither a
32 See Goodpaster, supra note 9.
33 See id. at 236.
34 To return to our pie analogy, litigation is a negative-sum game because, while the
parties argue over who gets the biggest piece, the lawyers are busy eating the pie.
35 See Dean G. Pruitt & Paul V. Olczak, Beyond Hope, in CONFLICT, COOPERATION
& JUSTICE 59, 68-71 (Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., 1995). A hurting stalemate occurs when both
parties perceive that further gains are not possible and that costs are persistent or rising.
Strictly speaking, further gains are possible in litigation, because either side can win at
trial. But where the outcome is uncertain, the parties may doubt that there will be any
gains. See id.
36 See Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the
Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 235, 241 (1993); Lee Ross &
Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 389, 389-409
(1991).
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joust between two knights, nor a gunfight in the Old West. It is, rather, World
War I trench warfare. The public shares this perception and reacts with
revulsion to the enormous waste of time, money, and emotional energy.
4. Healer
Gerald Williams has articulated a view of negotiation, and of the lawyer's
role in negotiation, which suggests that the expense and stress of litigation can
achieve resolution of conflict in positive ways. 37 In Williams's view,
negotiation is a ritual process which can, and in ideal circumstances will,
transform the lives of the parties. There is a clear parallel to Bush and
Folger's transformative mediation, 38 and substantial overlaps with Shaffer and
Cochran's notion that the lawyer and client engage in moral discourse. 39 The
lawyer, in this model, is a Healer who guides the client through a
transformative process.
One of the key steps in the process Williams describes is a "sacrifice" by
means of "ritual mortification." 40 The very elements by which the Litigator
seeks to impose his will upon the other party-legal fees and other expenses,
answering interrogatories, gathering documents, undergoing a deposition-
37 See Gerald R. Williams, Negotiation as a Healing Process, 1996 J. DIsp. RESOL.
1, 3-4.
38 See generally ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION (1994). The settlement counsel thesis can be stated quite succinctly, using Bush
and Folger's concepts of empowerment and recognition. Settlement is a by-product of a
process which involves alternating patterns of empowerment (appreciation of one's own
strength and ability to deal with problems) and recognition (acknowledgment of and
empathy for the situation and problems of the other party). See id. at 2-3. People generally
must feel empowered before they can give recognition. One route to immediate
empowerment is to hire a lawyer, an expert in conflict, as an agent.
However, if the other side also hires a lawyer, the balance of power is restored, and
now the lawyers themselves must feel empowered before they can give recognition on
behalf of their principals. For trial lawyers, empowerment comes from thorough
investigation of facts and analysis of relevant law, to achieve confidence of victory at trial.
This results in substantial delay and expense before recognition can be introduced into
settlement discussions.
Attorneys acting as settlement counsel can begin the alternation of empowerment and
recognition sooner, both because they understand the importance of giving recognition and
because, with a broader, problem-solving focus, victory at trial is not the sole issue.
39 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46 (1994).
40 Williams, supra note 37, at 49.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
enable the Healer's client "to see their own role in the conflict more clearly,
and open up the possibility of an appropriate, mutually agreeable
resolution."41 As Williams portrays it, the Healer is not simply the masochist
to the Litigator's sadist. Rather, both the stronger party and the weaker are
transformed, and benefit thereby, because each is less likely to become
involved in similar conflicts in the future, to the extent the conflict was caused
by or exacerbated by the party's own "developmental shortcomings." 42
Unlike the Champion and the Hired Gun, and like the Litigator, the
Healer seeks settlement. The Healer, moreover, seeks settlement not just to
end the conflict, but to resolve it, that is, to reach a mutually agreeable
resolution which will minimize residual negative effects and consequent
noncompliance or recurrence. However, because the Healer sees conflict
resolution as a ritual with several distinct stages, early settlement may not be
likely. Indeed, because the goal is deep, personal transformation, early
settlement may not be desirable.
5. Problem-Solver
There is another model of the lawyer in dispute resolution, one which is
gaining in popularity, 43 but which has not captured people's imagination like
the Champion or the Hired Gun. Where the Healer sees an opportunity for
moral growth, this lawyer sees a problem to be solved. 44 Facts and rights may
41 Id.
42 Id. at 56.
43 In 1984, while the conception of problem-solving negotiation was not new, it was
an approach rarely advocated by lawyers. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 757-758
& n.5. By 1997, a substantial number of lawyers were expressing a preference for
problem-solving, though few practiced it. See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 16, at 255.
The American Bar Association noted the trend towards mediation and problem-solving in
an American Bar Association Journal cover story entitled The Lanyer Turns Peacemaker.
See Reuben, supra note 12, at 55.
44 The tension between transformation and problem-solving is explored at length in
The Promise of Mediation. See BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38. Bush and Folger's
argument is provocative, and they are correct in identifying an important element in what
mediation does best. However, they go astray in presenting transformative mediation as a
response to conflict which is inherently and morally superior to problem-solving.
First, they understate the problem of mediator influence. There is no reason to believe
that transformative mediators will be any less directive in forcing recognition than problem-
solving mediators are in imposing solutions.
Second, their approach is truly empowering only if the parties themselves seek moral
growth, rather than a solution to an immediate and vexing problem. Imagine that the parties
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or may not be important. What is important is to identify the goals and
interests of the client and the opponent as efficiently as possible and to devise
satisfactory solutions to the problem based on those goals and interests.
Litigation may be an alternative, but it is not a tool, because it is usually
counterproductive to the Problem-solver's methods.
The model of lawyer as problem-solver is not clearly defined. 45 There are
no rules of civil procedure, little case law, and few war stories to guide the
problem-solving attorney. While there is a rich literature on problem-solving
negotiation,46 no clear image of the lawyer doing problem-solving emerges.
The negotiation literature is not written primarily for attorneys and frequently
warns that the attorney's customary approach to problems must be unlearned.
Part of the difficulty attorneys have in adapting to interest-based
bargaining may be precisely that they have no place of honor at the table. And
worse, not only is the literature not writtenfor lawyers, it is frequently written
about lawyers, as if they are some sort of specimen on a entomologist's
needle. The social science literature is often not helpful to a lawyer trying to
resolve a real dispute. Instead, we find inscrutable mathematical formulas or
charming fables about oranges or cakes. 47
The unfamiliarity of the model of lawyer as problem-solver may provide
a partial explanation why early settlement is difficult to achieve. But it is far
from a complete explanation. The question still remains: Why is it that so
many lawyers follow the path of the Champion, the Hired Gun, or the
to a dispute are faced with a choice between two mediators. The first promises to help them
work on their capacities for empowerment and recognition, with settlement as one possible,
but essentially unimportant, by-product of the process. The second promises to help them,
flawed as they are, to end the dispute by seeking a mutually agreeable outcome. I suspect
that most people would choose the problem-solver.
The danger is that transformative mediators, buoyed by a sense of moral superiority,
will impose upon the parties not a solution but an approach to conflict which may impede
the solution that the parties really want.
45 1 do not want to suggest that there is always a bright line distinguishing the other
models. The Hired Gun, when faced with a tough opponent, will frequently shift to a
"grind-it-out" Litigator style. For a client, the distinction between a Champion and a Hired
Gun may turn on whether she is your lawyer, or the opponent's.
46 See, e.g., Goodpaster, supra note 15; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 755 n. 1.
47 The familiar story about the parent who interrupts two children fighting over an
orange, and discovers that one wants only the peel while the other only wants the juice,
does illustrate very nicely the value of exploring the needs and interests of the parties. In
a real conflict, the difficulty lies not in understanding the principle, but in applying it in the
heat of an immediate conflict in which the actual needs and interests of the parties are
complicated and not easily discernible.
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Litigator rather than the Problem-solver? Why is it that the competitive,
positional bargaining associated with the other models is so prevalent? Is it,
as some suggest, that greedy lawyers do not really want to resolve disputes
until just before trial? While financial self-interest may be a factor in some
cases, the answer is more complex, and has to do with the two-edged sword
of "toughness."
B. The Lure of Toughness
The dirty little secret of much of the interest-based bargaining literature
is that toughness works-sometimes. A number of studies have shown that use
of a tough negotiating style can get the best results for clients in positional
bargaining. 48 Hard bargaining works best when the negotiator for the other
side is using concessions to induce cooperation. Hard bargaining also avoids
making unwise concessions, not because it requires an understanding of what
concessions would be unwise, but because the essence of the strategy is to
make no concessions (or at least minimal concessions). Hard bargaining,
however, has risks-it frequently leads to impasse. 49 This sometimes occurs
when the other side is strong and decides to fight fire with fire. It also occurs
when the other side is weak and refuses to capitulate to attempted
domination.50
48 See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 48; see also Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 15,
at 2-4.
49 See WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 49-50. In several interesting experiments, Korobkin
and Guthrie demonstrate that, in some situations, the contrary may be true-extreme
opening offers may encourage settlement, while moderate opening offers can actually
diminish the chances of eventual settlement. To explain, they point to the psychological
phenomena of "anchoring" and "cognitive dissonance." Anchoring occurs when the
extreme opening offers create an expectation in the other side about the value of the case
or create a benchmark by which the other side measures its progress in the negotiations.
Cognitive dissonance is the unpleasant experience of having contrary opinions about an
issue. Therefore, a moderate initial offer, once rejected, becomes harder to accept. See
Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 18-21.
50 The studies of "ultimatum bargaining" illustrate this point. In this type of
experiment, a man might be given five dollars and told to divide it between himself and
another person in any manner he chooses. The second person must then decide to accept
or reject the proposed allocation. If it is rejected, neither person gets anything. While, from
a purely rational point of view, the second person is better off taking any amount at all,
offers of substantially less than half of the total are generally rejected. See Issacharoff et
al., supra note 4, at 56; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 15, at 5 n.24 (citing ROBERT H.
MNOOKIN & LEE Ross, INTRODUCTION TO BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (1995)).
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It has been pointed out that a client deciding whether to hire a lawyer to
resolve a dispute faces a Prisoner's Dilemma. 51 A lawyer, planning the initial
litigation strategy, faces a similar dilemma. 52 The lawyer making the initial
contact about the dispute, not knowing how the other side will act, may in
good faith conclude that toughness, perhaps even intimidation, is the best
approach even though chances of a prompt settlement (which may be the best
result for both sides) are diminished.
51 See Jeff Hawkins & Neil Steiner, The Nash Equilibrium Meets BATNA: Game
Theory's Varied Uses in ADR Contexts, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REv. 249, 251 (1996).
The Prisoner's Dilemma is a construct used by social scientists to illustrate how individuals
faced with a choice whose consequences depend upon the independent, but unknown,
choice of another individual may rationally choose a course of conduct that results in a less
than optimal result. The construct involves a series of decisions to cooperate or compete,
with the highest mutual benefit if both parties cooperate, but the highest individual benefit
if one chooses to compete while the other side chooses cooperation. Correspondingly, the
lowest individual benefit occurs if one chooses to cooperate while the other chooses
competition. If both parties compete, each receives less than she would if both cooperated,
but more than she would if she cooperated while the other competed. The Prisoner's
Dilemma is usually illustrated as follows:
Player B's Choice
Player A's
Choice
Each party, not knowing what the other may do, could rationally elect to compete, to
avoid getting only 3 to the other party's 15. As a result each party may end up with 5,
though mutual cooperation would result in each party having a payoff of 10.
Additional information about the Prisoner's Dilemma may be found online at Jonathan
Blumen, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Sources (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http://www.
spectacle.org/995/source.html>. One can play an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game
against a computer at You Have Found the Prisoners' Dilemma (visited Mar. 12, 1999)
< http://semedip.brymnawr.edu/ ann/pd.html>.
5 2 See DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR:
BARGAINING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETIvE GAIN 158-164 (1986); Ronald J. Gilson
& Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between
Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 514-516 (1994).
Cooperate Compete
Cooperate Both get 10 A gets 3
B gets 15
Compete A gets 15 Both get 5
B gets 3
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One recent study noted lawyers' expressed preference for problem-solving
negotiation despite their almost exclusive reliance on positional bargaining. 53
The study found that while sixty-one percent of the lawyers surveyed indicated
that they would like to see more problem-solving, the lawyers actually used
the positional method in seventy-one percent of their cases. 54 The authors
concluded that a Prisoner's Dilemma provided the best explanation for the
paradox, but felt that given the ongoing communication in most settlement
discussions, lawyers should be able to avoid the dilemma. 55 That is, by
expressing their preference for the problem-solving style, lawyers should be
able to induce the opponent to use that style as well, if the opponent is one of
the sixty percent who prefer problem-solving. The authors concluded that
habit, or as they put it, using Leonard Riskin's phrase, the lawyer's "standard
philosophical map" 56 combined with a lack of the language required to switch
to problem-solving 57 explain the failure to escape the dilemma. 58
Whatever the explanation for failure to use problem-solving bargaining
over the long haul, the Prisoner's Dilemma provides insight into lawyers'
failure to use problem-solving initially. And, because competitiveness begets
competitiveness, the initial approach tends to establish the tone of negotiations
in the early stages of the dispute. If the prelitigation opportunity is missed, it
may be months before serious settlement discussions resume. In addition to the
insights into lawyer behavior provided by game theory, a lawyer has other
psychological reasons to adopt a hard-nosed approach to settlement.
1. Toughness and Girding for Battle
At the outset of a case, trial counsel is absorbed with the task of
developing a "theory of the case." The process itself is not theoretical, but
practical. In essence, the lawyer begins to tell a story, a story which will be
told and retold hundreds of times before the jury finally hears it. The story
takes into account the undisputed facts and resolves the disputed facts in a
53 See Heumann & Hyman, supra note 16, at 265-268.
54 See id. at 255.
55 See id. at 257.
56 Id. at 304 & n.73 (citing Leonard Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIo ST. L.J.
29, 43 (1982)).
57 See id. at 305-307.
58 My experience is somewhat different. I find that lawyers will adopt the language
of Getting to Yes without applying the principles. For example, I had a lawyer suggest that
in determining the value of a piece of property we should split the difference between my
client's appraisal and his client's, because that would be the "win-win" solution.
[Vol. 14:2 1999]
THE CASE FOR SETTLEMENT COUNSEL
manner both reasonable and favorable to the client. The story has tension; it
has a moral. It has heroes and villains-there can be no doubt about who is
wearing the white hat. A crucial part of the trial lawyer's task at the outset of
a case is therefore to polarize the dispute-to demonize the opponent and to
lionize the client.
A trial lawyer's mental preparation at the outset of a case involves not
only developing the story, but shaping her own attitude about the case. She is
girding for battle-getting ready to fight for the acceptance of her story and
the rejection of the opponent's story. She is selling herself on the case, so that
she can effectively sell it to judge and jury. This involves a certain amount of
deletion and distortion. That is, the lawyer ignores or downplays the
importance of facts which do not fit the story and "spins" other facts so that
they do fit. The lawyer is also selling the client on the case as the story gets
worked out and as the client's role as hero in the script becomes clear.
These steps are good and necessary if the trial lawyer is going to be an
effective advocate. However, in most cases, they are precisely contrary to the
steps which must be taken in a problem-solving approach to negotiation. To
polarize is to eliminate empathy. Problem-solving generally requires the
conflict to be depolarized and that recognition be given to the opponent's view
of the dispute. Adopting a problem-solving approach to negotiation will likely
interfere with the process that a lawyer is going through, and should be going
through, to prepare for litigation.
On the other hand, the tough approach permits the lawyer, both in
litigation and in negotiation, to have a single frame of mind. Without
retreating from a litigator's view of the case, a lawyer can easily say: "I am
fully prepared to try this case and am confident that my client will win at trial.
However, if you want to make an offer to avoid the expense of litigation, I
will communicate it to my client." It is easier still for the litigator to simply
make threats and then wait for the other side to realize how weak its position
is and surrender.
Attempting to establish dominance by threats is a common approach to
conflict resolution. It may be hard-wired into our brains. Think of Konrad
Lorenz's description of wolves, 59 Dian Fossey's accounts of gorillas, 60 and the
name-calling and shoving that precedes schoolyard fights.
For lawyers toughness is attractive, not only because it may lead to an
early capitulation by the other side, but because it positions the lawyer
5 9 See KONRAD LORENZ, KING SOLOMON'S RING: NEW LIGHT ON ANIMAL WAYS 186-
187 (1952) (describing a confrontation between a younger wolf and an older wolf).
60 See, e.g., DIAN FOsSEY, GORILLAS IN THE MIST 66-70, 144-145 (1983).
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favorably with the client. The "tough" lawyer can provide assurance to the
client that everything is under control. But this very assurance can lead to yet
another barrier to settlement, because it affects the way the client perceives his
situation.
2. Risk Aversion and Framing
The bargaining literature notes risk perception as one of the psychological
obstacles to settlement. 61 Briefly stated, people tend to value losses more than
gains. They feel the "pain" of giving up what they already have more than
they feel the pleasure of getting what they do not yet have. As a result, people
will refuse a trade-off which is objectively beneficial.
As a corollary, when people are faced with the choice of a certain gain
rather than a potentially greater gain which is uncertain, they choose the
certain gain. Or, as the psychologists say, they are "risk averse." However,
when faced with the choice of a certain loss rather than a potentially smaller
loss which is uncertain, they choose the potentially smaller loss. That is, they
are "risk preferring." 62 For example, in one reported experiment, people who
were given the hypothetical choice between a certain gain of three thousand
dollars, as opposed to an eighty percent chance of winning four thousand
dollars and a twenty percent chance of getting nothing, generally chose the
sure three thousand dollars. However, people given the choice between a sure
loss of three thousand dollars, opposed to an eighty percent chance of losing
four thousand dollars and a twenty percent chance of losing nothing, generally
chose to take a chance on having to pay nothing. 63
The implications for settlement of litigation are profound. Whether people
choose the risk of trial over the certainty of settlement may depend on whether
they perceive their choice as involving a loss or a gain. 64 Generally, one
would expect that plaintiffs (who stand to gain something) would be more
eager to settle, while defendants (who stand to lose something) would be more
61 See Mnookin, supra note 36, at 243-245 (citing Amos Tversky & Richard Thaler,
Anomalies: Preference Reversals, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1990, at 201; Amos
Tversky et al., The Causes of Preference Reversals, AM. ECON. REV., Mar. 1990, at 204).
62 See Goodpaster, supra note 15, at 346-349; Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We
Need a Mediator For?": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 1, 11 n. 19 (citing MARGARET A. NEALE & MAX H. BAZERMAN, COGNITION
AND RATIONALITY IN NEGOTIATION 44-48 (1991)).
63 See Goodpaster, supra note 15, at 347.
64 See Mnookin, supra note 36, at 243-246.
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reluctant to settle. Experience generally confirms this. Think of personal
injury litigation.
Therefore, it should encourage a party to settle if the situation is framed
as one involving a gain rather than a loss. When a party is facing uncertain
and expensive litigation, is emotionally distraught, and is concerned about
potential liability on claims of the opposing party, anything that will end the
immediate "pain" is likely to be seen as a gain. The certain gain of an
immediate settlement may appear more attractive than the less certain gain of
a resolution by trial in one or two years.
However, once the Champion arrives on the scene, the client's perception
may change. A Champion will assure the client that there is no immediate risk
and will discuss ti.e route to victory, with the predictable, and intended, effect
of diminishing the client's pain. The client then feels comfortable with the
status quo, may begin to see the future choice as involving loss rather than
gain, and may begin to prefer the risk of trial to the certainty of a settlement.
It is not surprising that hiring a lawyer would have this effect. One of the
reasons that lawyers (and courts, for that matter) are valued is that they "level
the playing field," so that a weaker client can withstand the pressure of a
stronger opponent. The psychological principle is the same. Under this
scenario, why do cases eventually settle? Because the client, for whatever
reason, be it increasing legal fees, an unpleasant deposition, or discovery of
facts which suggest an adverse judgment, once again begins to "feel the pain,"
so that any method of ending the litigation is seen as a gain. This is, after all,
the theory of the Litigator.
The fundamental point, for immediate purposes, is that simply by
becoming involved in a case, a lawyer may diminish the likelihood of early
settlement. And further, this will occur without the lawyer counseling against
settlement. It is likely to occur whenever the lawyer is an effective advocate.
C. Against Settlement
Aside from these psychological reasons which may result in lawyers
unconsciously discouraging settlement, lawyers have many good,
straightforward reasons for not aggressively promoting early settlement. They
include:
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" Litigator image. Even when the client's goal is settlement, it can be
argued that the best plan is to hire an attorney with a "litigator image." 65
This is the "toughness" argument, reframed slightly.
" Client expectations. While some clients are straightforward about wanting
to settle quickly, many are not. Faced with a potential client who wants
a warrior, a lawyer who follows Lincoln's advice and discourages
litigation66 may lose not only the prospect of a greater fee, but the client
as well. In an ADR counsel roundtable, reported in the September 1996
edition of Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation, an attorney in
private practice challenged the idea that law firms put economics ahead of
the client's interests by not pursuing ADR. He stated: "I talk ADR to just
about every client I meet, and my flunk rate on that is probably about
[ninety] percent .... Sometimes I've got to backpedal quickly or they're
going to call up and ask for one of my partners, [and] that's the last time
I hear from them." 67
" Client optimism. When a client has an overly optimistic view of the case,
efforts to push settlement may also lead to loss of the client. Aggressive
"reality testing" may be perceived as an attack on the prospective client's
veracity or her business acumen. However, when a lawyer encourages the
client, which is frequently the best marketing approach, there is likely to
be delay in achieving settlement. Once client expectations are raised, it
takes time to lower them. The safest method to achieve this is to let the
other side do the reality testing through discovery or pretrial motions.
There are substantial pressures, then, for the lawyer to defer settlement
65 See PHILIP SPERBER, ATTORNEY'S PRACTICE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS 343-344
(1985).
66 Lincoln once said: "Discourage litigation. Persuade neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often the real loser in fees,
expenses, and a waste of time. As a peacemaker, the lawyer has a superior opportunity of
being a good [person]." D. Todd Sholar, Note, Collaborative Law-A Method for the
Madness, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 667, 667 (1993) (quoting Glen Sato, Comment, The
Mediator-Lawyer: Implications for the Practice of Law and One Argument for Professional
Responsibility Guidance-A Proposal for Some Ethical Considerations, 34 UCLA L. REv.
507, 507 (1986) (quoting F. HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 102 (1906))).
67 Special Supplemental Proceedings, supra note 11, at 98. The typical roundtable
phenomenon of lawyers complaining about clients, while clients complain about lawyers,
may result from a selection process. Lawyers who attend ADR roundtables are likely to
prefer negotiation and mediation as methods for dispute resolution. To the extent they
encounter difficulty in their practice, it will be with clients who prefer a more adversarial
approach. Clients at ADR roundtables will have a corresponding problem with adversarial
lawyers.
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and to use litigation as a negotiation tool, both to manipulate the other side
into a more favorable position and to control the client.
• Uncertainty about the law. There have always been risks involved in
"telling would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop," to
use Elihu Root's phrase. 68 Those risks increase greatly in an era of rapid
change in the common law. When the law is unsettled, it becomes hard to
discern who, exactly, is the damned fool. Is it the client who wants to sue
McDonald's because its coffee is too hot, or is it the lawyer who turns
down the case and the seven-figure contingent fee that goes with it?
• Future shock. Increasing speed in publishing information about new
theories of recovery also makes for uncertainty. There was a time when
the most likely way for a lawyer to learn of a new theory was a law
review article or an ALR annotation, reviewing published appellate
decisions. Now a lawyer hears about the theory within days after the jury
verdict, by reading Lawyer's Weekly USA, American Trial Lawyer, the
National Law Journal, similar publications, or through Lexis Counsel
Connect or some other on-line source.
• Education. Historically, law schools have emphasized litigation over
negotiation and close analysis of fact and precedent over a search for
practical, creative solutions to real problems. To ask lawyers to seek the
latter pushes them out of their comfort zone.
• Popular image. Lawyers in the media are trial lawyers. We will know that
the ADR movement has come of age when the NBC Thursday night
lineup includes a show called "The Mediator."
• Personality. Given the popular image, law tends to attract people with
competitive dispositions, which tends to make the profession competitive,
which feeds the popular image, and so on, in a self-sustaining feedback
loop.
• Enjoyment. Litigation is challenging, exciting, and, dare I say it, fun. For
those who love trial work, life offers few joys greater than a successful
verdict after a hard-fought trial.
• Money. A firm makes more money by trying a case than by settling it.
Lawyers have been pushed, sometimes reluctantly, into viewing law as a
business. How many businesses do you know of where the seller has a
"duty" to discourage the customer from choosing a higher cost product or
service?
68 1 PHILIP JEssup, ELIHU ROOT 133 (1938).
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* Idealism. To settle is to give up not only the chance to win, but also the
chance to provide clients with what is rightfully theirs under the law. To
settle is to accept something less than justice.69
IV. THE DUTY TO SETTLE
In the face of all of the reasons why lawyers would be unwise to pursue
settlement, especially early settlement, it is frequently stated or implied that
lawyers have a "duty" to settle cases. 70 The ethical rules governing attorney
conduct suggest otherwise. What is required of lawyers is "zealous
advocacy."71 That does not sound like a clarion call to seek settlement.
Sometimes a duty to explore settlement is imposed by court rule. For
example, varying local rules of the federal district courts frequently require
attorneys to undertake a number of settlement directed activities. In their
milder form, the rules may require the lawyer to certify that the client has
been apprised about the availability and potential cost benefits of ADR. 72 In
their stricter form, the rules may require the lawyer to engage in good faith
settlement negotiations as early as possible. The stricter sort of rule exists in
the United States District Court for the District of Texas. 73 However, in
Dawson v. United States,74 noted in the May 1996 Alternatives to the High
69 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
70 See, e.g., JAMES W. JEANS, TRIAL ADVOCACY 430 (1975) ("Good practice and
proper consideration for the client dictate that the attorney representing an injured party
engage in settlement negotiations."); THYGERSON, supra note 4, at 51, 53-54 (criticizing
lawyers for interceding in disputes in order to move them to the legal arena and asserting
that a lawyer paid on an hourly basis has a conflict of interest with the client); Warren E.
Burger, "Isn't There a Better Way?," 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982) (noting that "[t]he
obligation of our profession is, or has long been thought to be, to serve as healers of human
conflicts"; also quoting the now-ubiquitous Lincoln directive to "discourage litigation,"
discussed supra note 66); Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 235-236 (noting that court mandated
ADR schemes that leave the lawyer as the "primary switchman" for dispute resolution
attempt to separate a lawyer's duty from his self-interest). More generally, the criticism
that lawyers "foment controversy," Issacharoff et al., supra note 4, at 51, is at root an
assertion that lawyers have an obligation to quiet controversy.
71 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1998).
72 See, e.g., D. MASS. R. 16.1.
73 See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND
DELAY REDUCTION PLAN § IV (1993).
74 68 F.3d 886 (5th Cir. 1995).
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Costs of Litigation,75 the Fifth Circuit reversed sanctions imposed on attorneys
who had refused to make a cash settlement offer to an inmate injured in a
prison softball game.76 The court felt that the defendant's desire to discourage
similar lawsuits and the expectation that the plaintiff might simply drop the
suit justified the refusal to make a more substantial offer.77 While regarding
early settlement as a laudable goal, the court ruled that "good faith" requires
only an open mind, not a specific result. 78
Case law has generally held that courts cannot require parties to settle, 79
and some court rules expressly provide that parties cannot be pressured to
settle in court-sponsored programs. 80 This is not to say that lawyers have no
responsibility for settlement. A lawyer who dissuades a client from accepting
a good settlement offer and instead urges fruitless and ill advised litigation
may be liable in malpractice. 8' On the other hand, a lawyer may be liable for
advising settlement when the offer is too low.82
In short, notwithstanding Lincoln's often-quoted advice to discourage
litigation, lawyers have no overarching duty to settle cases. Ultimately, the
decision to settle, or not, rests with the client.83 At the outset of a dispute, the
merits of settlement versus litigation are generally not clear. A lawyer can, in
good faith, advise either course. Court rules cannot change this. Court-
ordered settlement, like court-ordered mediation, is an oxymoron.
With personality, training, financial incentives, and various risk factors
all weighing in against early settlement, it may be too much to ask lawyers,
75 See Wat Is a "Good-Faith" Settlement Effort?, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COSTS
LITIG. 59, 59 (1996).
76 See Dawson, 68 F.3d at 898.
77 See id. at 898.
78 See id. at 897-898.
79 See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985); Semiconductors, Inc. v.
Goksa, 525 So. 2d 519, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); see also Winston, supra note 8,
at 203-204.
80 For example, Rule 6(i) of the Massachusetts Uniform Rules on Dispute Resolution
provides: "Inappropriate Pressure to Settle. Courts shall inform parties that, unless
otherwise required by law, they are not required to make offers and concessions or to settle
in a court-connected dispute resolution process. Courts shall not impose sanctions for
nonsettlement by the parties." News from the Courts, MASS. LAW. WKLY., May 11, 1998,
at 26.
81 See Spilios v. Cohen, 647 N.E.2d 1218, 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
82 See Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1380 (Mass. 1986).
83 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1998).
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operating under our current model of dispute resolution, to follow Lincoln's
advice. The solution is to change the model.
V. SETTLEMENT COUNSEL-THEORY
The basic idea of the settlement counsel model is to have an attorney,
other than trial counsel, attempt to resolve the dispute by negotiation, before
litigation commences in earnest. One fundamental purpose of using settlement
counsel is to change the model of dispute resolution so that a lawyer's "duty
to settle" is aligned with self-interest, both financial and psychological. The
lawyer has a duty to explore settlement, not because Warren Burger said so,84
or because of a court rule, but because the client has directed it. The attorney
is paid to explore settlement, knowing that another attorney will handle the
case if efforts to reach a negotiated solution are unsuccessful. The pressure to
be a Champion, or a Hired Gun, or a Litigator is reduced so that problem-
solving can take place.
Another purpose is to encourage the client to carefully weigh all
alternatives before choosing litigation. I do not suggest that settlement counsel
should press for settlement despite a strong litigation alternative. The
attorney's obligation is to help the client reach an optimal result, not to reduce
court caseloads. However, settlement counsel is encouraged to look at the
overall situation, not just the legal aspects, to determine what factors make a
solution optimal.
One other fundamental purpose of the settlement counsel model is to
provide room for a "value creating" phase of the negotiations, before the
"value claiming" begins in earnest.8 5 There is no guarantee that the parties
will utilize interest-based bargaining at this time, but the incentives to do so
are greater because settlement counsel, operating on a short time frame, wants
to avoid an impasse and arrive at a range of "Pareto optimal" solutions as
soon as possible. 86
84 See generally Burger, supra note 70.
85 "Value creating" may be defined as the process of devising "increased sum"
solutions to the parties' common problems; "value claiming" is the process of dividing up
the gains that the parties have created. LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 52, at 30, 32.
86 A "Pareto optimal" solution is one of the potential solutions to a negotiating
problem which maximizes the potential joint gains for each party. That is, neither party will
give anything more to the other party without getting more for itself. As it is sometimes
put, in a Pareto optimal solution, the parties "leave nothing on the table." The range of
Pareto optimal solutions to a particular negotiation is sometimes referred to as the "efficient
frontier." HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 139, 158-164 (1982);
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Principled bargaining sounds wonderful in theory, but it is extraordinarily
difficult to apply in a dispute that, on its face, seems to be about money,
especially in the charged atmosphere that precedes most litigation. "The
problem is not so much that lawyers do not know about nonadjudicatory
methods of solving disputes-anyone with a spouse or a child has had to learn
other techniques. Rather, the problem, as noted earlier, is that the mind-set
needed to do effective problem-solving is incompatible with the mind-set
needed to pursue litigation whole-heartedly. Put simply, it is difficult to do
creative problem-solving while beating on your chest and throwing clumps of
grass in the air. By using settlement counsel, a client may be able to create a
calm before the storm, a calm in which problem-solving can occur. Perhaps
most importantly, settlement counsel should have an advantage over trial
counsel in overcoming commonly identified obstacles to settlement.
A. Why Cases Do Not Settle
There is substantial literature on the question of why cases do not settle,
or do not settle sooner. 87 Some of those reasons have already been touched on
in discussing why lawyers lack incentives to produce early settlement.88 Other
reasons advanced suggest that efforts at early settlement are misdirected.
Others involve psychological barriers to communication in negotiations. 89 A
complete discussion of those obstacles, and how settlement counsel could
better address them, is beyond the scope of this Article. However, a review
of some of the most commonly cited obstacles shows how settlement counsel
has a distinct advantage.
1. The Case Should Not Settle
It is frequently asserted that some cases are inappropriate for settlement
for strategic reasons. There may be a need to establish a precedent. 90 The
Goodpaster, supra note 15, at 327.
87 See generally DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES: EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES FOR LAWYERS AND MEDIATORS (1996); THYGERSON, supra note 4; Issacharoff
et al., supra note 4; Mnookin, supra note 36; Ross & Stillinger, supra note 36; see also
SPERBER, supra note 65, at 340-347; Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 222.
88 See supra Part III.
89 See generally sources cited supra note 87.
90 See GOLANN, supra note 87, § 8.3, at 235; SPERBER, supra note 65, at 340;
Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 222.
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client may want to "send a message" to third parties-e.g., other potential
claimants. 91 The client may feel the need for retribution to remedy a perceived
injustice. 92 (Indeed, litigation itself may be seen as a form of retribution,
either by imposing costs of litigation or by impairing a competitor's ability to
compete.) A company may want to protect its reputation. 93 The bargaining
strength of the parties may be so unequal that one side feels the need to resort
to the courts to level the playing field. 94
Whatever the validity of these reasons, the fact remains that ninety percent
of all cases settle. 95 Cases in which the above factors are present may fall
within the remaining ten percent. It is likely, however, that many cases that
"should not settle" do settle in the end. At some point before trial, the client
decides that the need for retribution or for a precedent does not outweigh the
benefits of settlement. Or, the party realizes that reputation is better protected
by a confidential settlement. The natural question: Why did the party not come
to this realization sooner? The task of settlement counsel is precisely to help
the client engage in a thoughtful weighing of alternate strategies before
beginning litigation.
2. A Better BATNA
It is sometimes urged that clients should not settle if they believe that the
net result after trial, including the costs incurred by going to trial, is better
than the other side's settlement offer. In the patois of Getting to Yes, one
would say that the client has a better BATNA (Best Alternative to a
Negotiated Agreement).96
As with the first obstacle, this does not explain how it is that so many
cases eventually settle. One would expect that if the trial alternative were
better at the outset, before significant litigation costs were incurred, it would
remain so throughout the litigation. 97 Has the BATNA really changed, or is
the problem rather that the initial assessment was only half-hearted?
91 See SPERBER, supra note 65, at 340.
92 See id.
93 See GOLANN, supra note 87, § 8.3, at 235; cf. Issacharoff et al., supra note 4, at
70-71 (noting that in medical malpractice cases physicians may regard reputation as an
impediment to settlement).
94 See Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 229.
95 See Davis, supra note 3, at 229 & n.2.
96 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 97-106.
97 This raises the issue of psychological errors in predicting the outcome of legal
disputes and the impact of those errors on settlement discussions. See GOLANN, supra note
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All too often parties do not fully explore the possibilities of early
settlement or the costs (financial and emotional) of the alternative. It is
surprising how often people who would not spend twenty thousand dollars on
a new car without carefully considering options will spend several times that
much on litigation without undertaking a serious cost-benefit analysis of the
alternatives. Once again, settlement counsel is retained precisely to undertake
such an analysis.
3. Time to "Cool Off'
Another reason, proffered more often by practitioners than by professors,
is that the parties need time to let emotions settle down before serious
settlement discussions can take place. If there is genuine interest in early
settlement, this approach is simply wrong-headed. It ignores the critical role
of the initial stages of negotiation in setting reference points and in establishing
the tone for the entire negotiation.
The appeal of a cooling off period is clear. For those favoring a positional
bargaining style, setting of the "target point" (goal) and "resistance point" or
"reservation price" (bottom line) is the first order of business. 98 Those
reference points control the pattern of concessions which will eventually
permit compromise, or not. To permit those points to be set while emotions
are running high jeopardizes the eventual success of negotiations. In addition,
87, § 8.2, at 223-234; Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Issues of Informational Assymetry
in Legal Bargaining, in Dispu'T RESOLUTION: BRIDGING TmE GAP, supra note 4, at 79, 79-
80; Issacharoff et al., supra note 4, at 52; Ross & Stillinger, supra note 36, at 390. A full
discussion of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article, not to mention the expertise of
the Author. This much can be said: While settlement counsel has no crystal ball to foresee
the outcome of litigation, he is less susceptible to some of the prediction errors that have
been identified.
Farmer and Pecorino discuss the problem of information asymmetry-i.e., ignorance
about the other side's case-and how case information is communicated indirectly through
settlement offers and demands in contentious positional bargaining. See Farmer &
Pecorino, supra, at 80, 90. Settlement counsel is unlikely to use that bargaining style and
will take a direct approach to finding out information about the other side's case. Settlement
counsel is also less likely to withhold information in order to amplify litigation threats.
Settlement counsel is not free from bias in assessing client information and
communications from the other side. However, to the extent that settlement counsel can
reduce enmity and induce cooperation, bias may be lessened. See Ross & StiUinger, supra
note 36, at 397. In addition, settlement counsel will be aware of the problem of bias and
of techniques such as framing and use of a mediator to counter its effects.
98 See RAiFFA, supra note 86, at 45; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 770.
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the sort of highly competitive behavior likely to result from high emotions will
beget similar behavior from the other side, resulting in an impasse. 99 Lawyers
may be inclined to delay negotiations so that the parties can negotiate more
cooperatively with lower initial reference points.
In reality, this argument is not so much an argument for a cooling off
period as it is an argument against positional negotiation. The positional
negotiator frequently lacks tools to defuse emotions, other than making
concessions. This approach may prove unwise if the other side treats those
concessions as a sign of weakness. The "principled" negotiator acknowledges
that emotions are an issue. The first two tasks in what Ury calls the
"breakthrough strategy" are to gain control of your side's emotions by
"stepping to the balcony" and to deflect the other side's emotions by "stepping
to their side. "100
For many reasons, the cooling off strategy is likely to fail. The
accusations and probing discovery typical in hotly contested litigation are
likely to elevate, not lower, the temperature of the dispute. Even if no
settlement communications occur at the outset, parties ask their lawyers about
the value of the case, and "anchoring" will occur, without the benefit of
dialogue with the other side. 101
As expenses begin to be incurred, parties often feel that they have to get
their legal fees back in order to avoid losing ground, making settlement even
less likely. Business disputes and other cases in which hourly fees are charged
are not zero-sum games at the outset, precisely because there is a mutual
opportunity for saving legal fees. As that opportunity diminishes, the parties
may find themselves in a situation where litigation seems the least unpalatable
alternative-i.e., the only way to get back what has already been spent.
Time is critical for another reason. To allow a cooling off period is to
disregard the positive influence that deadlines can have on dispute resolution.
Deadlines can assist parties in getting through some of the psychological
barriers to settlement. 102 Professor Dwight Golann suggests a six-step strategy
for settlement which begins with creating a "settlement event" to overcome
procrastination and other causes of delay in settlement. 103 The threat of filing
a complaint can create such an event.
99 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 15, at 780-782.
100 WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 11, 16-33, 35-37 (1993).
101 See Goodpaster, supra note 15, at 349-350.
102 See Ross & Stillinger, supra note 36, at 398-400.
103 See GOLANN, supra note 87, § 2.1.1, at 41.
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Courts also use settlement events to promote settlement. The Early
Intervention Program in Massachusetts 04 as well as Early Neutral Evaluation
(ENE) programs in several U.S. district courts 105 have produced settlement
in thirty-seven to sixty-six percent of cases within the first four to six months
104 The Massachusetts Early Intervention Program was the result of a task force of
judges and lawyers assembled to advise the Supreme Judicial Court's Standing Committee
on Dispute Resolution. The group's final report, dated October 12, 1995, urged a statewide
plan for early court intervention in which a judge, or a clerk-magistrate if no judge were
available, would meet with attorneys in a case, not more than six months after the answer
is filed, to discuss settlement as well as case scheduling and management conflicts. See
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT/TRIAL COURT STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE COURTS app.D, 63-67 (1996).
In a telephone conversation with Wrentham District Court Judge Daniel Winslow, the
Author learned that a pilot phase of the program was implemented in the Wrentham Court
as well as in several other courts. Judge Winslow reported that in his court, approximately
50% of civil cases settled before or at the early intervention conference and that half of the
remaining cases settled before the pretrial conference. He further stated that in January
1998, the program was expanded to all district courts in Norfolk and Middlesex counties.
Comparison of case disposition rates in those two counties for the first five months of 1998
with rates for the comparable period for the previous year showed that management
conferences were having a measureable impact. In some courts, the disposition rate
quadrupled over the previous year. See Telephone Interviews with Judge Daniel Winslow,
Wrentham, Massachusetts District Court (May 15, 1998, July 22, 1998).
105 In the Early Neutral Evaluation program used in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California, an experienced trial attorney is appointed to give the parties
a neutral evaluation of their case within three to four months after the case is filed. See
WAYNE D. BRAZm, EFFECTIVE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
AND JUDGES 26-30 (1988); Robert Peckham, Supplement: Early Neutral Evaluating, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 101 (Lawrence Freedman
et al. eds., 1987). Even though ENE is not designed primarily to encourage settlement,
37 % of the cases in which ENE was held settled during the evaluation or as a result of it.
See Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR Programs: Why They
Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important
Values, University of Chicago Legal Forum 46 (1990), summarized in SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT/TRIAL COURT STANDING COMM. ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION FOR THE CHIEF JUSTICE
FOR ADMIN. & MANAGEMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION ON THE MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT 68,
68 (1998). In a similar program in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont,
almost 40% of the ENE eligible cases settled before the ENE session and 26% of the cases
participating in ENE reached full settlement at the session. Sessions were generally to be
held about halfway through the eight-month discovery period. See John Fitzhugh, Report
Card on ENE: Early Neutral Evaluation in the Vermont Federal District Court, ADR
CURRENTS, June 1998, at 11, 11-14.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
after a case is filed. While the timing of federal ENE programs and the
Massachusetts Early Intervention Program would permit several months for
the parties to cool off, the results in each of these programs belies the
conventional wisdom that cases are not ripe for settlement until the time of the
pretrial conference, after all discovery is completed. They also show the value
of a settlement event in promoting early settlement.
For the Litigator, the filing of a complaint is the signal to begin the
process of wearing the other side down. For the Champion, filing the
complaint is the first step in waging battle for the client. Both will want to file
suit immediately. For settlement counsel, the filing of the complaint is an
important deadline that should not be permitted to pass without squeezing out
the last drop of dispute resolution potential. The next significant court-imposed
deadline may not occur until the pretrial conference a year or more in the
future.
While it requires skill, tact, and persistence to achieve settlement in the
face of strong emotions and the rush to battle, there is a significant chance that
an important settlement opportunity will be missed if negotiations are put on
the shelf for a few weeks or months to allow time for cooling off. Settlement
counsel operates on a shortened time frame and usually cannot afford a
cooling off period. His or her task is to get beyond the heightened emotions,
to seek a sensible and mutually satisfactory solution to the problem at hand,
and to do so immediately.
4. Critical Facts in Dispute
One reason frequently given for failures of settlement is the existence of
factual disputes on important issues. 106 The implication is that a case can be
settled only after all important factual disputes have been resolved. Any
lawyer in a litigation practice knows that this is nonsense. Cases settle every
day, some of them on the courthouse steps, without a resolution of factual
disputes. Indeed, it has been noted that the uncertainty that results from
unresolved facts can itself provide an incentive to settle. 10 7 Mediators,
especially those of the facilitative flavor, tend to be less enamored of facts
than most lawyers. 108
106 See GOLANN, supra note 87, § 8.1, at 218; Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 226, 228.
107 See Goodpaster, supra note 9, at 226.
108 See generally Albie M. Davis, Follett on Facts: Timely Advice from an ADR
Pioneer, 7 NEGOTIATION J. 131 (1991).
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Settlement counsel takes a different view of the facts for another reason.
The facts which must be resolved to render a verdict in a case are not
necessarily the ones which are important for settlement purposes. For
example, in a case involving enforcement of a covenant not to compete, there
may be a hotly contested factual dispute about whether the former employee
took away a customer list. However, if the employer's primary interest is to
protect certain key accounts, it may be possible to settle the case without
resolving the customer list issue.
In general, where the problem-solving model of negotiation is used, the
most important "facts" have to do with a party's goals and interests. The focus
of discussion tends to be the future, rather than the past. From this vantage
point, it can be less important to determine whether one person did, or did
not, breach some legal duty to the other. Settlement counsel, using a problem-
solving approach, is therefore less likely than trial counsel to get bogged down
in the "he said, she said" of prelitigatory posturing. Where there genuinely are
facts critical to achieving settlement in dispute, settlement counsel has a
panoply of ADR devices, short of a full trial, to resolve them. Mediation,
neutral evaluation, mini-trial, and binding or nonbinding arbitration of key
issues are all available if negotiation fails.
5. It Is a Matter of Principle
While appeals to principle can often be written off as a tactic of those
angling for a better settlement, this is not always a safe assumption.
Sometimes a cigar is just a cigar. Cases in which important principles are truly
at stake tend to be the most intractable, for settlement counsel as well as for
trial counsel. The difference is that trial counsel will be sorely tempted to
break off the frustrating negotiations and use the litigation to punish the other
side for their intransigence. Settlement counsel does not have this option. For
settlement counsel, to give up is to surrender.
Settlement counsel is also less likely to be trapped by appeals to principle.
A "principled" negotiator knows that there are many principles and that few
disputes involve only one of them. Through his experiences implementing
mediation programs as a former Chief of the Government Bureau for the
Attorney General of Massachusetts, Suffolk University Law Professor Dwight
Golann developed a number of approaches to mediating cases in which
principles figure prominently. 109 Some of the techniques, such as reducing
109 See Dwight Golann, If You're Willing to Experiment, 'Principle' Cases Can Be
Mediated, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosTs LITIG. 37, 50 (1998).
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external pressure, refraining the situation to de-emphasize the principle,
pointing out the danger that a particular moral principle may not be accepted
by the court, and introducing third parties with moral authority, 110 can be
applied by settlement counsel directly. Others can be effected by a mediator,
if that step is necessary.
This is not to suggest that settlement of cases involving principle, or any
of the above obstacles, will be easy. But for all the reasons described above,
settlement counsel should, in theory, produce better results than trial counsel
in early resolution of legal disputes. To my knowledge, there has been no
systematic study to confirm this, but there are scattered reports indicating that
the settlement counsel model is being used successfully throughout the
country.111
VI. SETTLEMENT COUNSEL-PRACTICE
A. News from the Front
A model with substantial similarities to the settlement counsel model,
known as collaborative law, was begun in the early 1990s by a group of
lawyers in Minneapolis. The model was discussed in a 1993 law review
article. 112 It has spread to other areas of the country, especially among
practitioners in divorce and family law. 113 More recently, a member of a San
Francisco collaborative outlined the basic principles:
Described simply, the collaborative law process consists of two parties
and their respective attorneys, who sign a binding stipulation defining the
scope and sole purpose of representation: to help the parties engage in
creative problem-solving toward a negotiated agreement designed to meet the
legitimate needs of both of them. In the collaborative law process, the parties
agree that no one will threaten litigation to coerce compromises, and if either
party does resort to the courts for dispute resolution, both lawyers are
automatically disqualified from further representation of either of them
against the other. 114
110 See id. at 50-51.
I11 See discussion infra Part VI.A.
112 See Sholar, supra note 66, at 669-673.
113 See id. at 667-668.
114 Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Law: A New Approach to Family Law ADR,
CONFLICT MGMT., Summer 1996, at 12, 13.
[Vol. 14:2 1999]
THE CASE FOR SETTLEMENT COUNSEL
Practice of collaborative law has been found to reduce both
contentiousness and cost. One practitioner has estimated the cost of a divorce
using the collaborative approach to be one-third the cost of a typical litigated
divorce.11 5
James McGuire heads the ADR practice group at the Boston firm of
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer. He began his practice in litigation, but as
he realized over time that he was developing a distinctive set of skills in
settling law suits, he moved into ADR. 116 He has acted as settlement counsel,
using the two-track approach both with lawyers in his own firm and lawyers
from other firms, and also using the model suggested here-attempting to
resolve cases before litigation commences. He has devised a number of ways
in which settlement counsel can charge a premium for their services, based
upon the benefit conferred in settling the case quickly. The March 1998 issue
of Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation reported McGuire's
participation in an ADR roundtable sponsored by the CPR Institute for Dispute
Resolution, in which he suggested that the best role for lawyers in alternative
dispute resolution is neither as neutrals nor in process design but in acting as
settlement counsel. 117
When the Southern California firm of Irell & Manella wanted to create an
ADR department, they lured John Wagner from his position as a federal
magistrate judge in the Northern District of Oklahoma. 118 On the bench,
Wagner had a strong interest in promoting settlements. He established and
administered a court-annexed mediation program which provided an
opportunity to experiment with the timing of settlement efforts. Initially, he
found that lawyers were "outside their comfort zone" if asked about settling
before discovery was completed and observed that lawyers were often so busy
litigating that they missed golden opportunities to settle cases. Both on the
bench and in private practice, Wagner observed the advantages which
settlement counsel brings to resolution of difficult disputes. As a magistrate
judge, he had presided over the settlement of a matter which had involved
numerous hearings, a trial, and multiple appeals over twenty-three years of
115 See Sholar, supra note 66, at 672.
116 See Telephone Interview with James McGuire, Head of ADR Practice Group,
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer (May 26, 1998).
117 See Winter Meeting Supplement, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH Cosrs LrTG. 45, 48
(1998).
118 See ADR Briefs: Private Lawfirm Will Open ADR Center, 16 ALTERNATIvES TO
HIGH CosTs LIG. 42, 42 (1998); Telephone Interviews with John Wagner, Member of
ADR Department at Irell & Manella (Mar. 25, 1998, June 24, 1998).
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bitter litigation. This case was finally settled when one side retained settlement
counsel. This perspective shaped Wagner's approach to acting as settlement
counsel. He has found that he can initiate settlement talks without showing
weakness. He can say: "Our firm characteristically takes a two-track approach
in cases like this, exploring settlement while litigation goes on. My job is to
settle the case." 119 Wagner's role as settlement counsel enabled him to
structure a successful stand-still agreement as an alternative to a preliminary
injunction in a hotly contested case in which the survival of a business was at
stake. He is certain that trial counsel alone could not have gotten the same
result because the litigation was so contentious.
In the January 1998 issue of the American Bar Association Journal,
Natasha Lisman of Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen in Boston reported
using an approach to early settlement that is sensible, if unusual.' 20 She
suggested to opposing counsel that the parties hold a one-day mediated
negotiation, after a voluntary exchange of all discoverable documents. In the
two cases in which she tried the approach, it was successful.121 Her account
articulates the following factors which can make this approach difficult for
lawyers: (1) the leap of faith required to open files to opposing counsel; (2)
the loss of a larger fee; and (3) the risk that the client may feel that the lawyer
who wants to talk settlement right away is not zealous. 122 While noting that
there are cases in which this approach might not work-e.g., where
depositions are necessary-she believes that there are many cases in which it
could successfully be used. 123
David Hoffman of the Boston firm of Hill & Barlow reports success in
achieving early settlement even in cases where depositions are required. The
technique he has used is a time-limited deposition, generally two to four hours
long, geared towards getting information needed for settlement. He has used
the technique both during litigation and before a complaint is filed. Hoffman
believes that because people will not mediate a case twice, information
necessary to permit case assessment should be obtained before the mediation
session. The additional expense will be justified by the increased likelihood of
reaching a settlement. 124
119 Telephone Interview with John Wagner, supra note 118.
120 See Steven Keeva, Inventing Solutions, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 58, 61-62.
121 See id.
122 See id. at 62.
123 See id.
124 See Telephone Interview with David Hoffman, Hill & Barlow (July 10, 1998).
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This anecdotal evidence shows that lawyers cannot uniformly be described
as discouraging early resolution of cases. To the contrary, many lawyers are
searching for ways to overcome obstacles to settlement and are using the
settlement counsel approach to do so. From my own experience, as well as the
reports of others, it is possible to delineate the basic settlement counsel
technique.
B. Technique
The task of settlement counsel will typically begin when the lawyer is
retained for the express purpose of exploring the possibility of a reasonable
settlement before litigation begins or during the pleading stage. Counsel meets
with the client, and perhaps some friendly witnesses, to gain a sufficient
understanding of the dispute, makes a preliminary determination that the other
side has some interest in immediate negotiations, and probes to determine the
client's underlying interests and the client's perception of the other side's
interests. Counsel then focuses on the client's specific goals and budget.
With this information, counsel and client are ready to do an initial analysis
of the alternatives. This may take the form of a risk analysis using a detailed
decision tree, 125 or it may be less formal. The key is that the client understand
the expected costs and benefits of litigation and have a clear goal for the
negotiations. If settlement counsel has litigation experience, he can estimate
the costs of litigation. Otherwise, another attorney must be utilized. The final
step is to develop an initial strategy for the negotiations. A time frame should
be established. Otherwise, there is a risk that counsel's optimism and self-
confidence, not to mention financial self-interest, may unduly prolong futile
discussions.
Once the preliminary work is done, counsel can begin discussions with the
other side, framing the negotiation in problem-solving terms. Counsel probes
to discover the other side's real interests and to uncover potential win-win
approaches. Jockeying for position is avoided at this stage. The goal is to
create an atmosphere which maximizes the incentives for value creation, or
at least minimizes the risks. Only after there has been a thorough opportunity
to explore mutually satisfactory resolutions should the next phase of the
negotiations begin.
If a mutually beneficial approach has been discovered, the dispute can
125 See, e.g., Marjorie Corman Aaron & David P. Hoffer, Using Decision Trees as
Tools for Settlement, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH CosTs LITIG. 71 (1996); James E.
McGuire, Risk Analysis in Mediation, Disp. RESOL. J., May 1998, at 15.
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move to resolution using integrative methods. If, as is more likely in most
legal negotiations, there is no clear win-win solution, counsel must decide how
to proceed. The interest-based model of Getting to Yes 126 can still control, or
counsel can shift to a more traditional, competitive method for the value
claiming stage. This depends on the individual negotiator's style and
experience. If information needs to be exchanged to permit negotiations to
continue, that can be done by voluntary exchange of information or, if
litigation has commenced, by limiting initial discovery to facts needed to
resolve the dispute. This sort of phasing of discovery is encouraged by Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f)(2).127
If negotiations stall, counsel may want to suggest an appropriate form of
ADR to keep the ball rolling. There is no need to wait for court intervention
to create a "multi-door courthouse"; all of the tools are there, waiting to be
used. The question of which method of ADR to try can only be answered on
a case-by-case basis, but, in general, less intrusive and less expensive
alternatives, like mediation, will be preferred over mini-trials and arbitration.
As more adjudicative forms of ADR are considered, counsel must help the
client weigh the costs and benefits of bringing in trial counsel immediately.
There is nothing revolutionary in the technique of settlement counsel
described above. It simply involves using standard, time-tested techniques of
client counseling and interest-based methods of negotiation. What is different
is that by changing the model to have separate counsel attempt negotiations
before the litigation commences, the lawyer is freed to use problem-solving
methods to the fullest.
C. The Value of an Explicit Model
One potential obstacle to using problem-solving methods to the fullest
extent looms large-the other side. Inducing the other side to adopt a problem-
solving style may be settlement counsel's foremost challenge. There is always
the risk that the other side will, in bad faith, encourage settlement counsel to
make concessions or to disclose valuable information without reciprocating.
Does this mean that settlement counsel is at a disadvantage when dealing with
trial counsel on the other side? If so, does this disadvantage mean that the
client may be unwise in retaining settlement counsel to begin with?
126 See FISHER ET AL., supra note 15, at 40-55.
127 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0(2) ("The [proposed discovery] plan shall indicate the
parties' views and proposals concerning... (2) the subjects on which discovery may be
needed, when discovery should be completed, and whether discovery should be conducted
in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular issues.").
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Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin explored a similar problem-how
lawyers can cooperate in the exchange of information in litigation.128 They
suggest that parties deciding whether to litigate cooperatively face a Prisoner's
Dilemma. 129 If one party is forthcoming in providing damaging information,
while the other side stonewalls, the first party will be at a disadvantage in the
litigation. This dilemma can be avoided if each side signals its willingness to
litigate cooperatively. Parties can send such a signal by hiring a cooperative
lawyer.130
The problem then becomes finding a cooperative lawyer. Gilson and
Mnookin focus on the "reputation market" as a means of carrying out the
search.131 They suggest two strategies for developing a reputation for
cooperativeness-creation of a boutique firm specializing in cooperative
litigation and creation of a specialized department for cooperative litigation
128 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 52, at 509.
129 See id. at 514.
130 See id. at 522.
131 Id. at 525-527. Gilson and Mnookin posit two types of lawyers-cooperative
lawyers and gladiators. They reason that cooperative lawyers will be more highly valued
because they produce more efficient results. Clients should therefore be willing to pay a
premium for their services. In theory, the reputation market both enables the client to find
cooperative lawyers and ensures the lawyers continued cooperativeness. That is, a lawyer
who "defects" and acts uncooperatively in a particular case risks losing the reputation for
cooperativeness and the ability to charge the premium which goes with that reputation. See
id. at 526.
A parallel argument can be made for settlement counsel. Because settlement counsel
produce more efficient results, the client should be willing to pay a premium for their
services. In this way, skilled lawyers have a financial incentive to move from litigation to
dispute resolution as an area of practice and have an incentive to problem-solve in the
immediate case. The question of whether, and under what circumstances, ADR counsel can
charge a premium for services, and the related issue of the viability of law firm ADR, is
hotly debated. See Winter Meeting Supplement, supra note 117, at 47. It will be years
before the issue is resolved, and it will ultimately be settled not at a roundtable, but in the
marketplace.
Gilson and Mnookin make an intriguing argument. However, the premise that clients
value cooperative lawyers more highly than gladiators is contrary to conventional wisdom.
It would be useful to confirm the premise by a comparison of hourly rates, or otherwise.
The authors also posit a system driven solely by rational, economic behavior. I have
discovered that, in practice, this is often not the case. For both litigators and settlement
counsel, cooperation is difficult if the client seeks retribution or is otherwise emotionally
distraught. There is the further question of the lawyer's ability to control a combat-minded
client, particularly in the current buyer's market. Whatever economic incentives a lawyer
may have to act cooperatively, the ultimate decision to settle, or not, rests with the client.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
within a large firm. 132 The parallels to Fisher's suggestions of a boutique ADR
firm and a specialized ADR department are clear. 133 What is less clear is that
a reputation market can function effectively. Gilson and Mnookin conclude
that there is a functioning reputation market in some areas of the law (e.g.,
divorce litigation) but not in others (e.g., business litigation). 134
When reputation does not provide a touchstone to identify opposing
counsel as cooperative or as a gladiator (or for that matter, a Champion, Hired
Gun, Litigator, or Healer), an explicit model of the process may help. Counsel
is proven trustworthy not by reputation from previous cases, but by observable
behavior in complying with an agreed process for resolution. The key question
is whether counsel will, in this case, suspend litigation, take a problem-solving
approach to negotiations, make the client available for a settlement meeting,
disclose key documents, enter into mediation, and so on. Of course,
information about past performance is useful, but should not dictate the
approach taken by settlement counsel. The ultimate issue is trust, not
reputation. By being aware of the risks of unreciprocated cooperation and by
using an explicit model to monitor the other side's cooperation, a lawyer can
minimize any disadvantage that settlement counsel obtains from initiating
cooperation.
A clear picture of the steps involved in settling the case will not only help
determine whether opposing counsel is "playing ball," but will also help
explain what it means to "play ball." In my experience, the idea of suspending
litigation to do problem-solving is foreign to many attorneys. Simply saying,
"I would like to see if the case can be settled," may not communicate any
more than, "I am comfortable with my case but will let you persuade me not
to go forward." It is often necessary to lay out some win-win possibilities and
to describe the problem-solving method in more detail. 135
There is another potential benefit in being explicit about the approach. It
invites the other side to help shape the dispute resolution process. If opposing
counsel is not well known, the process of building mutual trust can start. In
transformative terms, the dance of empowerment and recognition can begin
before sensitive substantive issues are at stake. Defining the dispute resolution
process helps the parties to own the dispute. Time spent negotiating about the
132 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 52, at 557-561.
133 See Fisher, What About Negotiation, supra note 1, at 1222-1224.
134 See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 52, at 564-565.
135 On one occasion when I was attempting to lay out the process I had in mind, the
other attorney suddenly brightened and said, "You want to mediate the case without a
mediator." Because most attorneys have at least a nodding acquaintance with mediation,
that may be as good a way as any to describe the problem-solving approach.
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shape of the table can be time well spent, as shown by a study of construction
mediation.
In 1990 the Forum on the Construction Industry undertook a survey of
mediation and other forms of ADR in the construction industry. Based on 552
completed surveys, an analysis was done of the factors distinguishing those
cases that settled in mediation from those that did not. 136 The amount in
controversy, the length of the mediation, the perceived quality of the
mediator, the number of different techniques used by the mediator, and the
extent of discovery were all significant predictive factors. 137 The most
significant factor, however, was a surprise:
Of all the variables in the model, the source of the mediation rules used
(RULES.USED) was, by far, the best predictor of mediation settlement. If
rules developed by the AAA, CPR, or some other institution (including the
court) were used, settlement was significantly less likely to occur than when
parties developed their own rules. One explanation might be that the process
of developing the rules forms a critical prelude to the actual (and successful)
mediation. If rules can be hammered out successfully between and among the
parties, as opposed to accepting some prepared or standardized rules, the
outcome seems already predetermined. .. . [C]ontrolling for other features
of the process, settlement is approximately five times more likely when parties
develop their own rules.138
An explicit model of the problem-solving approach therefore not only helps
to define the process, it can help to implement it. The model requires a certain
amount of flexibility. Sometimes it may be counterproductive to create the
"calm before the storm"-e.g., where injunctive relief may be needed and
voluntary delay would undercut a claim of immediate, irreparable harm. The
decision about which approach to use and who should serve as settlement
counsel-indeed, whether to use settlement counsel at all-can be made only
after assessing the costs and benefits in particular cases.
136 See Henderson, supra note 21, at 127.
137 See id. at 131.
138 Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
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VII. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. Disadvantage to Client: Increased Costs
The primary potential disadvantage to use of separate settlement counsel
is increased cost. There may be cases where the additional cost would prove
prohibitive. For example, detailed knowledge of the client's business may be
an absolute prerequisite to negotiation of an acceptable settlement. Trial
counsel may already possess that knowledge, and there may be no other
attorney available with a sufficient basis of information so that the additional
details could be learned in short order. These cases should be very rare.
Mostly the danger will be that the client will pay for duplicative efforts.
The problem of paying two lawyers for the same work is susceptible to
control. When hired to resolve the case before litigation commences,
settlement counsel should be careful to produce written work product to
document efforts on the case. Trial counsel should receive, at a minimum, the
beginnings of a trial notebook, including the following: (1) a case overview,
listing likely theories of recovery, available defenses, and an estimate of the
damages under each theory; (2) a detailed chronology; (3) a statement of
material facts; (4) legal memoranda or photocopies of relevant cases; (5)
copies of key documents; (6) a summary of settlement negotiations to date;
and (7) a list of areas where additional information is required for a complete
case evaluation. In addition, where witnesses have been interviewed or experts
consulted, the notebook should include witness statements or notes of witness
interviews and expert reports. Settlement counsel should be prepared to
provide the above information on a computer disk in a generally accepted
format-e.g., WordPerfect or Word. In a complex case, database or
spreadsheet information should similarly be available. Settlement counsel will,
of course, turn over any documents received by way of informal discovery
from the opponent and will provide copies of documents given to the
opponent.
Trial counsel should be able, within a short period of time, to absorb the
information gathered by settlement counsel and do an independent assessment
of case strengths and weaknesses. If settlement counsel has been efficient in
gathering the information, the issue of cost duplication will involve how
quickly trial counsel can get the benefit of the work already done. Using the
approach outlined, the additional cost should be modest in most cases.
When a two-track method is used, both settlement counsel and trial
counsel will be learning about the case simultaneously. Some cost savings
might be achieved by letting settlement counsel rely upon facts gathered by
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trial counsel, and vice versa, but this is likely to be inefficient. In order to deal
with the issue of duplicative cost under a two-track approach, law firm
consultant Peter Zeughauser has suggested a method whereby settlement
counsel works on a contingent fee basis while trial counsel is paid on an
hourly basis. 139 If settlement counsel is able to negotiate a settlement, a fee
will be awarded based upon saved legal costs.
In general, settlement counsel lends itself to more flexible fee
arrangements. For budget purposes, it should be easier to estimate the cost of
an effort to settle than of full litigation. Use of settlement counsel adapts well
to current notions of controlling costs by dividing the case into phases and
using different fee structures for each phase. 140 Where the scope of work can
be clearly defined, a fixed fee may be appropriate. Another billing method,
unit pricing, gives the client some comfort that costs are under control, while
not requiring prescience of counsel. Under this approach, the client will pay
an agreed amount for defined units of work-e.g., interviewing a witness,
drafting a demand letter, preparing a decision tree, and preparing for and
conducting a settlement meeting. Actual cost will depend upon how many
witnesses are interviewed, whether a decision tree is prepared, and so on. The
client, by participating in the decision of what steps will be taken, has greater
control over costs than in an hourly rate case. At the same time, the lawyer
is not required to completely specify the scope of work in advance, as would
be required under a fixed fee arrangement.
The client may wish to provide counsel with an incentive to settle the case
and can do so by sharing savings over an agreed upon "resolution value. 1 41
139 Zeughauser's proposals are discussed in Peter D. Zeughauser, Price & Product:
A Proposal for a Focused ADR Structure, 15 ALTERNATIvES TO HIGH COSTs LITIG. 141,
155 (1997), and in William F. Coyne, Jr., Free Structure Questioned, 16 ALTERNATIvES
TO HIGH CosTs LrrIG. 37, 38 (1998).
140 See Robert E. Litan & Steven C. Salop, More Value for the Legal Dollar: A New
Look at Attorney-Client Fees and Relationships, in ABA SATELLITE SEMINAR: VALUE
BILLING: DOES IT WoRK? 129, 162 (1993).
141 See F. Mark Kuhlmann, Alternative Fee Arrangements: A Cost Control or a
Process for Quality Results, in ABA SATELLITE SEMINAR: VALUE BILLING: DoES IT
WoRK? 169, 177 (1993). I have used this sort of arrangement when acting as settlement
counsel. A form agreement is published in Kuhlmann, supra, at 177. James McGuire of
Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer, in a telephone interview with the Author, reported
having used the same method and, in addition, has occasionally taken cases on a "double
or nothing" approach. No fee is paid unless settlement is achieved, but if settlement is
successful, the client pays twice the usual hourly rate. See Telephone Interview with James
McGuire, Brown, Rudnick, Freed & Gesmer (May 26, 1998).
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If an hourly rate agreement is used, it may be possible to achieve savings by
use of a lower hourly rate, combined with a contingent bonus for successful
settlement. As an incentive for litigators to refer work, settlement counsel may
wish to devise an arrangement in which the litigator shares any bonus.142
B. Benefits Where No Settlement Is Reached
The methods described above can minimize the additional legal expense
from use of settlement counsel, but the expense cannot be eliminated. Even
under a contingent fee arrangement, the client is responsible for the expenses
incurred by settlement counsel. If settlement counsel fails to achieve a
negotiated resolution, can settlement counsel still add value? Can that value
equal or exceed what the client has spent? In many cases the answer will be
yes.
For the reasons described above, use of settlement counsel can increase
the prospect of eventual settlement. Misunderstandings may be cleared up,
strengths of the other side's position may be appreciated, and the emotional
temperature of the dispute may be lowered. All of these will facilitate later
settlement efforts. In addition, the client has received a second opinion on
relevant matters, including case evaluation and likely case costs. Use of
settlement counsel may diminish litigation costs, even if the case goes to trial.
By engaging in informal discovery, and by focusing on the critical issues,
settlement counsel may make the litigation more efficient.
There are benefits for trial counsel as well. Settlement counsel has
absolute immunity for actions in prelitigation investigations; communications
with the client are privileged, and settlement counsel would be available to
testify to prior inconsistent statements of witnesses without jeopardizing the
client's ability to keep chosen trial counsel. If settlement counsel continues to
bear responsibility for settlement negotiations, the client has a very credible
"good-cop, bad-cop" tool. If trial counsel takes over settlement discussions,
there is a different advantage-lowered client expectations. If settlement
counsel has been effective, the client should now have a much more realistic
appraisal of the value, or likely cost, of the case. It will be easier for trial
counsel to discuss case weaknesses without risk to the working relationship,
or to the long-term relationship.
Where the client has not retained trial counsel, settlement counsel may be
able to assist in the selection. Settlement counsel may have knowledge or
connections that would help the client to locate a trial attorney with
142 This approach was suggested in a telephone interview with Judge John Wagner,
Irell & Manella (June 24, 1998).
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appropriate expertise. Settlement counsel may also be able to assist the client
in procuring the most advantageous fee arrangement with trial counsel, for
example, in locating trial counsel who will handle the case on a contingent
basis. Where the client does not already have in-house counsel, settlement
counsel may, in effect, fill that role for a particular dispute.
C. When to Use Settlement Counsel
The cost-benefit analysis will differ with every case. However, there are
some categories of cases which lend themselves to use of settlement counsel.
" When the dispute involves a contract which requires mediation before
litigation, it is sensible to choose counsel who will take maximum
advantage of this opportunity for settlement. Trial counsel will be sorely
tempted to use early mediation as an opportunity to posture or to "see
what the other side will offer." Because parties are unlikely to mediate
twice, this represents a significant lost opportunity.
" Where there is the potential of a continuing relationship between the
parties, both sides have an incentive to resolve the dispute with a
minimum of contentiousness.
* If the dispute is mostly about money, and mutual savings are possible
through early settlement, the parties have an opportunity for a win-win
resolution if they act quickly, before legal fees begin to mount. Most
commercial disputes fall into this category. Where the costs of litigation
will be significant compared to the amount in dispute, the case cries out
for settlement counsel.
* Where there is a misunderstanding between the parties, settlement counsel
is in a better position to clear up the confusion. It may not always be clear
at the outset that misunderstanding is at the root of a dispute, but if there
has been poor communication, or minimal communication between the
parties, the possibility is worth exploring.
Conversely, there are some categories of cases in which using settlement
counsel will likely prove counterproductive. Cases in which immediate action
is required-e.g., cases involving threatened misappropriation of trade
secrets-come to mind. In addition, where the other side will not negotiate in
good faith, settlement counsel may needlessly run up costs. In such cases,
settlement counsel may have a role to play, but only after trial counsel has
been able to get the other side's attention.
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Not only the type of case, but the attitude and circumstances of the client,
will determine if it makes sense to try settlement counsel. Where the client,
after consideration of the options, is determined to pursue litigation to
judgment, it would be a waste of time to retain settlement counsel.
Conversely, where the client has decided to resolve the case by negotiation if
possible, and where the existing attorney-in-house counsel, the transaction
lawyer, or trial counsel-is capable of implementing the technique described
earlier, there may be no need for a second attorney to pursue settlement.
In most cases, however, the client is not certain as to the best course, or
the client and current advisor (in-house counsel, transaction attorney,
accountant, or trial counsel) may disagree about the best course of action. In
this situation, it makes sense to consider retaining settlement counsel. The
following chart illustrates the range of possibilities. In the situations numbered
1 and 9, there may be little reason to consider the settlement counsel
alternative. In the other seven situations-which have been shaded-the option
of early settlement using settlement counsel ought to be considered. Moreover,
where the client is not an individual, but a corporation, partnership, or other
entity, there may not be unanimity among the decisionmakers. For example,
the CEO may favor litigation while other officers have concerns about the
outcome. In this situation, corporate counsel may welcome the support
provided by outside counsel who can speak freely, and knowledgeably, about
the pros and cons of litigation.
Lawyer wants to Lawyer not sure Lawyer wants
litigate to settle
Client wants to
litigate 1 2 3
Client not sure 4 5 6
Client wants to
settle 7 8 9
VIII. CONCLUSION
Courts, corporate clients, and society as a whole have focused on the
problem of delay in resolving legal disputes. Unfortunately, the underlying
premise for much of the effort to solve the problem is that trial lawyers should
encourage settlement and should be chastised or sanctioned for failing to do
so. The current approach ignores real constraints on lawyer behavior and
expects lawyers to act against their self-interest. By hiring an experienced
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litigator, skilled in negotiation and ADR, to settle the case, the client brings
the lawyer's duty and interest into alignment.
The model for settlement counsel presented here should produce better
results in achieving early settlement. Settlement counsel has an advantage over
trial counsel because of a narrower focus, a shortened time frame, and
freedom to use problem-solving to the fullest. Settlement counsel has an
advantage over transaction counsel because of litigation experience. Settlement
counsel has an advantage over in-house counsel because of greater
independence and frequently because of greater litigation experience as well.
The model is not just theoretical. Attorneys all over the country are
already implementing it in various ways. Many other attorneys have indicated
their willingness to embrace problem-solving and have proven their
willingness to use mediation to resolve disputes.
I do not suggest use of settlement counsel as a panacea. However, for the
ninety percent of civil cases which do eventually settle, using settlement
counsel is a viable way to encourage them to do so sooner.

